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I. Introduction
In January 2018, the Trump Administration announced that it
would open up the coastal waters of the United States to new
offshore oil and gas drilling, lifting a ban placed by President

† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of North Carolina School of Law. Articles Editor, North
Carolina Journal of International Law.
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Obama.1 Despite the concerns of coastal states2 impacted by this
decision, the Trump Administration plans to move forward with
lease sales in twenty-five of twenty-six regions of the Outer
Continental Shelf, including areas off the coast of Alaska and
California.3 While this plan has seemingly been put on hold
following a federal court decision in Alaska,4 the Trump
Administration has appealed the decision, and it is unclear whether
future offshore leases will be permitted in other areas of the
country.5 Despite the Trump Administration’s enthusiasm for
1 Lisa Friedman, Trump Moves to Open Nearly All Offshore Waters to Drilling, N.
Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/climate/trump-offshoredrilling.html [https://perma.cc/FDX3-TBJZ] [hereinafter Friedman]. For more detail about
the proposed plan, see UNITED STATES BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 2019-2024
NATIONAL OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING: DRAFT PROPOSED PROGRAM
(Jan.
2018),
https://www.boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-2019-2024/
[https://perma.cc/SG5R-WX38]. For an overview of the status of the proposed 2019 to
2024 Proposed Program, see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44692, FIVE-YEAR OFFSHORE OIL
AND GAS LEASING P ROGRAM FOR 2019-2024: STATUS AND ISSUES IN BRIEF (2019).
2 Generally, in this paper, “coastal states” or “states” refer specifically to coastal
states or territories of the United States as defined by the Coastal Zone Management Act,
whereas “Coastal States” or “States” refer to nations with a coastal boundary, unless
context demands otherwise. Under the Coastal Zone Management Act, “coastal states” is
defined as “a state of the United States in, or bordering on, the Atlantic, Pacific, or Arctic
Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island Sound, or one or more of the Great Lakes” as well
as the other U.S. island territories. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1453(4)
(2017).
3 Friedman, supra note 1.
4 Nathan Rott, Trump Administration Puts Offshore Drilling Plan On Hold After
Setback
in
Court,
NPR
(Apr.
25,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/25/717214683/trump-administration-puts-offshore-drillingplan-on-hold-after-setback-in-court [https://perma.cc/2DKR-PU46] [hereinafter Rott].
For the full text of the order, see League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp.
3d 985 (D. Alaska 2019).
5 Rott, supra note 4; see also Elizabeth Harball, Trump Administration Appeals
Ruling that Blocked Arctic Offshore Drilling, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (May 28, 2019),
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2019/05/28/trump-administration-appeals-ruling-thatblocked-arctic-offshore-drilling/ [https://perma.cc/6P77-SNFC] (describing the original
decision and the filing of the appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals). Other actions
have been filed by various states and environmental groups against the Trump
Administration relating to oil and gas exploration in both inland and offshore areas,
including actions filed in opposition against oil and gas leases on public lands in Wyoming,
Utah, and Colorado. Nichola Groom, U.S. Green Groups Ramp Up Legal Attacks on
Federal Oil Leases, REUTERS (June 13, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usadrilling-protests/u-s-green-groups-ramp-up-legal-attacks-on-federal-oil-leasesidUSKCN1TE1B6 [https://perma.cc/2WZ5-L6RL]. A lawsuit filed against the Trump
Administration challenges rollbacks of the 2016 Well Control and Blowout Preventer
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offshore oil, this plan faces significant opposition from coastal
areas.6 Conversely, the Trump Administration’s enthusiasm for
offshore drilling does not extend to offshore wind, despite
widespread support for offshore wind development among coastal
states.7
As the possibility of offshore oil and offshore wind energy
exploration continues to be debated, issues of how best to regulate
offshore drilling and wind in light of shared environmental and
economic concerns will arise.8 Despite these concerns, some states
and other countries are continuing to expand both offshore wind and
offshore oil operations, while others move to delay or cease offshore
energy exploration altogether.9

Rule, which was implemented after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. Liz Trotter,
Lawsuit Challenges Trump Administration’s Rollbacks of Offshore Drilling Safety Regs,
EARTHJUSTICE (June 11, 2019), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2019/lawsuitchallenges-trump-administration-s-rollbacks-of-offshore-drilling-safety-regs
[https://perma.cc/4GDT-3XJY]. Several coastal states have joined a lawsuit seeking to
block seismic testing in the Atlantic Ocean. Darryl Fears, Nine State Attorneys Join
Lawsuit Opposing Air Guns to Search for Oil in the Atlantic, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/12/20/nine-state-attorneysjoin-lawsuit-opposing-airguns-search-oil-atlantic/ [https://perma.cc/R9JW-M54V].
5 Friedman, supra note 1.
6 Id.
7 See Benjamin Storrow, Trump Admin Throws Wrench into Offshore Wind Plans,
E&E NEWS (Aug.
12,
2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060921573
[https://perma.cc/GJ4Z-M3J4].
8 Friedman, supra note 1.
9 See, e.g., Robert Walton, Connecticut Issues Draft RFP for 2 GW Offshore Wind,
UTILITY DIVE (July 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/Q8AT-MXVA] (describing Connecticut’s
request for proposals to develop an offshore wind farm by the end of 2026); Cheri Carlson,
State Ends Offshore Oil, Gas Leases; Company Says 50 Employees May Lose Jobs, VC
STAR
(July
5,
2019),
https://www.vcstar.com/story/news/specialreports/outdoors/2019/07/05/offshore-oil-gas-leases-ventura-santa-barbaracoast/1630906001/ [https://perma.cc/2VC3-N9NM] (discussing oil and gas leases off the
coast of Santa Barbara and Ventura counties which were terminated by the California State
Lands Commission); David Weston, The Hot and Cold Markets of 2019 So Far,
WINDPOWER
MONTHLY
(July
4,
2019),
https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1590071/hot-cold-markets-2019-so-far
[https://perma.cc/3VTV-PBA5] (describing global market trends in the first half of 2019);
Mary B. Powers et. al., U.S. Offshore Wind Project Awards Push Market Boundaries,
ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD (July 3, 2019), https://www.enr.com/articles/47137-usoffshore-wind-project-awards-push-market-boundaries
[https://perma.cc/7YJF-2FY9]
(describing proposed offshore wind projects in several US states); Vanessa Bates Ramirez,
The Biggest Offshore Wind Project in the US is Underway, SINGULARITYHUB (June 28,
2019), https://singularityhub.com/2019/06/28/the-biggest-offshore-wind-project-in-the-
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The decision to open up offshore lands to leasing comes as part
of President Trump’s ongoing effort to encourage the development
of energy production while reducing the regulatory burdens of
developing those resources.10 Notably, as directed by the President
in Executive Order (“EO”) 13,795 in April 2017,11 the Trump
Administration prioritizes an “America-First Offshore Energy
Strategy” to “maintain the Nation’s position as a global energy
leader and foster energy security and resilience for the benefit of the

us-is-officially-underway/
[https://perma.cc/D6Z8-MP7W]
(describing
recent
developments concerning projects in the US and the EU to expand offshore wind capacity);
Staff Report, Offshore Wind Lease Area Surveys Underway, COASTAL REV. ONLINE (June
27, 2019), https://www.coastalreview.org/2019/06/offshore-wind-lease-area-surveysunderway/ [https://perma.cc/EC97-2Y3X] (discussing geographic surveys occurring near
Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, to pursue the development of an offshore wind farm in the
region based on a federal land lease); US Offshore Wind Market Doubles in Size, OFFSHORE
ENGINEER (June 25, 2019), https://www.oedigital.com/news/467694-us-offshore-windmarket-doubles-in-size [https://perma.cc/5B8Y-UQK9] (discussing the expansion of the
market for offshore wind in the United States since 2018); Ali Akhyari, Federal Agency
Looking at South Carolina Coast for Wind Energy, SOUTH STRAND NEWS (June 22, 2019),
https://www.southstrandnews.com/news/federal-agency-looking-at-south-carolina-coastfor-wind-energy/article_3857c00c-92d0-11e9-a603-9fb534d2e4bb.html
[https://perma.cc/GYG9-CL2Z] (discussing BOEM’s ongoing assessment of offshore
wind capacity in areas along North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida coasts);
Jack Unwin, Energy Ministers to Extend Offshore Wind Cooperation in North Sea, POWER
TECH. (June 21, 2019), https://www.power-technology.com/news/offshore-wind-northsea-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/V4Q3-4X9X] (discussing an agreement between North
Sea countries to increase collaboration in order to reduce costs and increase offshore wind
capacity); Walter Cruickshank, Path Forward for Offshore Wind Leasing on OCS,
WORKBOAT (June 12, 2019), https://www.workboat.com/blogs/maritime-matters/pathforward-for-offshore-wind-leasing-on-ocs/ [https://perma.cc/9LD9-BCVU] (describing
BOEM’s “Proposed Path Forward for Future Offshore Renewable Energy Leasing on the
Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf”); Clifford Krauss & Declan Walsh, Egypt Looks to
Offshore Gas Field for Growth and Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/business/energy-environment/egypt-gas.html
[https://perma.cc/F3AC-29M5] (describing how the discovery of oil in the Mediterranean
is seen as a potential windfall to the Egyptian economy); The Wind Energy Capacity in
2018, REVE (June 21, 2018), https://www.evwind.es/2019/06/21/at-least-103-countrieshave-commercial-wind-energy-capacity/67662
[https://perma.cc/8UYF-BFBF]
(discussing an increase in overall wind capacity in 2018, including offshore).
10 See Sam Pickerill, Brief: Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy
Strategy (Executive Order 13795), DUKE SCIPOL (July 21, 2017),
https://scipol.duke.edu/track/dcpd-201700287-executive-order-13795-implementingamerica-first-offshore-energy-strategy
[https://perma.cc/TTU3-2T5E]
[hereinafter
Pickerill].
11 Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815, 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017).
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American people.”12 In this Executive Order, the President directed
the Secretary of Commerce to streamline permitting of seismic
research and refrain from designating National Marine Sanctuaries
unless there is a full accounting of energy potential within the
designated area, including energy from wind, oil, gas, or other
resources.13 The Executive Order further instructed the Secretary of
the Interior to examine various regulatory regimes under other
federal agencies to review, revise, and withdraw proposed
regulations, as well as to expedite requests related to marine
mammal protection.14 The Secretary of the Interior subsequently
released Secretary’s Order 3,350, which indicated that, in order to
implement EO 13,795, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(“BOEM”) would rescind the previous 2017-2022 Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, which excluded
lease sales in the Atlantic and off the coast of Alaska.15
The regulatory scheme of offshore oil and gas implicates both
federal and state interests.16 While some parties are in support of
the proposals by the Trump Administration, there is significant
opposition among coastal states that may be affected by this plan.17
Outside of the coastal states directly affected, members of the

Id.
Id. § 4.
14 See id. §§ 6 – 11; see also Pickerill, supra note 10.
15 SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3,350, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, at 2,
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/press-release/secretarial-order-3350-offshore508.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX5F-R72H]. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
Secretary Zinke Signs Orders Implementing America-First Offshore Energy Strategy
(May
2,
2017),
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-zinke-signs-ordersimplementing-america-first-offshore-energy-strategy
[https://perma.cc/TTK3-ECB4]
(describing the context of the signing of Secretary’s Order 3350).
16 See Pickerill, supra note 10 (explaining that the Outer Continental Shelf is under
both state and federal jurisdiction).
17 See Friedman, supra note 1 (describing coastal governor’s opposition to offshore
drilling plans); see also Hiroko Tabuchi, Trump Administration Drops Florida From
Offshore
Drilling
Plan,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
9,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/climate/trump-florida-offshore-drilling.html
[https://perma.cc/W9DW-UP4Z] (describing an agreement between the ex-Secretary of
the Interior and ex-governor of Florida not to consider Florida for any new offshore oil
and gas platforms); Rosanna Xia, Gov. Brown Signs Bills to Block Trump’s Offshore Oil
Drilling Plan, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-meoffshore-drilling-20180908-story.html [https://perma.cc/5HFE-GT9Q] (describing two
bills signed by California Governor Jerry Brown which block new offshore drilling in
California).
12
13
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American public are increasingly opposed to allowing more
offshore oil and gas drilling in the United States’ waters, according
to Pew Research Center.18 Even though opposition increases with
proximity to the coast, 51% of the American public19 oppose
increased offshore drilling, compared to 42% who favor it.20 Of
Americans who live within 25 miles of a coastline, 56% of people
oppose increased offshore and gas drilling, compared to only 34%
who favor it.21 Polling conducted by Gallup indicates that the
American public favors protecting the environment over production
of traditional energy sources including oil, natural gas, and coal,
with 59% favoring the environment.22 Likewise, 71% of Americans
believe that the United States should rely on alternative energy
sources instead of oil, gas, and coal.23 The issue carried into the
2018 midterm elections, where candidates from both parties in
coastal states responded to public opposition to offshore drilling and
seismic testing by switching their policy positions to align with the
proposal’s opposition.24 As recently as May 2019, a survey
18 Bradley Jones, More Americans Oppose than Favor Increased Offshore Drilling,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 30, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/01/30/more-americans-oppose-than-favor-increased-offshore-drilling/
[https://perma.cc/ZMS4-CRSH] [hereinafter Jones].
19 The “American public,” in this instance, consists of persons sampled by Pew
Research Center, which sampled 1,503 adults in all 50 states and D.C., weighed according
to the 2016 American Community Survey. For more on the methodology used, see
Methodology, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/1-29-18-offshore-drilling-methodology.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KV6P-2VWE].
20 Jones, supra note 18.
21 Id.
22 RJ Reinhart, In the News: Offshore Drilling, GALLUP (Jan. 5, 2018),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/225053/news-offshore-drilling.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8HCV-VVH7].
23 Id.
24 Madeleine Carlisle, Trump’s Offshore-Drilling Plan is Roiling Coastal Elections,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
5,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/trumps-offshore-drilling-plan-isroiling-coastal-elections/566726/ [https://perma.cc/U9TD-286A]. One example where the
issue of offshore drilling impacted the 2018 Midterms: 69% of Florida voters passed
Amendment 9 to the Florida constitution, which bans both indoor vaping and offshore
drilling between 3 to 9 miles off the coast. Steve Patterson, Rutherford Aims to Ban
Offshore Drilling Around Florida, FLA. TIMES-UNION (June 28, 2019),
https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20190628/rutherford-aims-to-ban-offshore-drillingaround-florida [https://perma.cc/ZU2A-FN43]; A.G. Gancarski, U.S. House “BEACHES
Act” Would Ban Offshore Florida Drilling, FLA. POLS. (June 28, 2019),
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conducted in North Carolina’s 3rd Congressional District25
revealed that 62.8% of respondents “want the government to reduce
regulation in order to allow for more offshore wind
development[,]”26 and 38.8% of respondents “strongly oppose any
offshore drilling, while just 24% strongly support it.”27 The public
opposition to offshore drilling has translated into laws and
regulations at the state and national levels, as many coastal states
push back against offshore drilling.28

https://floridapolitics.com/archives/300011-u-s-house-beaches-act-would-ban-offshoreflorida-drilling [https://perma.cc/G9QC-WQX4].
25 North Carolina’s 3rd Congressional District consists of all or parts of Currituck,
Camden, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Chowan, Tyrrell, Dare, Hyde, Beaufort, Pamlico,
Carteret, Pitt, Craven, Onslow, Jones, Lenoir, and Greene counties. Staff Report, Poll:
Wind Favored Over Offshore Drilling, COASTAL REV. ONLINE (July 2, 2019),
https://www.coastalreview.org/2019/07/poll-wind-favored-over-offshore-drilling/
[https://perma.cc/B82C-7B5Q]. These counties overlap with most of the counties that fall
under North Carolina’s Coastal Area Management Act jurisdiction, which consists of 20
coastal counties. See About Coastal Management, N.C. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY,
https://deq.nc.gov/about/divisions/coastal-management/about-coastal-management
[https://perma.cc/VUC5-LJBM]; CAMA Counties, N.C. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY,
https://deq.nc.gov/about/divisions/coastal-management/about-coastal-management/camacounties [https://perma.cc/W49K-DGDS].
26 Polling Memo, OUTER BANKS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET. AL. (June 28, 2019),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1y7nFIwcRQQBrJhMeT1ZV5OOam2q2a75v/view
[https://perma.cc/474T-JPD5]; see also Ginger Livingston, 3rd District Voters Oppose
Offshore
Drilling,
REFLECTOR
(July
7,
2019),
http://www.reflector.com/News/2019/07/07/3rd-District-voters-oppose-offshoredrilling.html [https://perma.cc/HX9G-QMSA]; Staff Report, Poll: Wind Favored Over
Offshore
Drilling,
COASTAL
REV.
ONLINE
(July
2,
2019),
https://www.coastalreview.org/2019/07/poll-wind-favored-over-offshore-drilling/
[https://perma.cc/C6JU-DE89].
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Bo Peterson, SC DHEC Says No to Offshore Oil Exploration Company
as
Incompatible
to
Coast,
POST
&
COURIER
(July
8,
2019),
https://www.postandcourier.com/news/sc-dhec-says-no-to-offshore-oil-explorationcompany-as/article_7b0b7ed2-a1af-11e9-abbe-5bdd79b1ae3b.html
[https://perma.cc/W7EZ-HRBE] (describing a determination by South Carolina’s
Department of Health and Environmental Control to deny certification of an oil company’s
proposed seismic testing for the purposes of finding oil deposits off the coast as
inconsistent with South Carolina’s Coastal Zone Management Act); Kevin Frey, US House
Votes to Block Offshore Drilling off Atlantic Coast, SPECTRUM NEWS (June 25, 2019),
https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nc/triangle-sandhills/politics/2019/06/25/us-house-votesto-block-offshore-drilling-off-atlantic-coast [https://perma.cc/3C9L-MMD4] (discussing
a proposed amendment in the United States House of Representatives blocking offshore
exploration on the Atlantic coast); JoAnn Merrigan, Bill Would Ban Offshore Drilling,
WSAV3 (June 20, 2019), https://www.wsav.com/news/bill-would-ban-offshore-drilling/
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According to the International Energy Agency (“IEA”), more
than a quarter of today’s oil and gas supply is produced offshore.29
Globally, although offshore oil production has remained stable
since 2000, the production of natural gas from offshore sources has
increased by 50%, as has production of offshore electricity
generation from offshore wind.30 Within the United States,
deepwater oil production31 increased by 25% between 2005 and
2015.32 Globally, offshore oil production accounted for 30% of total
oil production between 2005 and 2015.33 As of 2016, the United
States and Brazil accounted for more than 90% of the ultradeepwater34 production.35
Although the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
[https://perma.cc/8K4F-HFN9] (discussing legislation introduced into Congress from a
South Carolina representative); Staff Report, DCM Objects to Company’s Seismic Plan,
COASTAL REV. ONLINE (June 12, 2019), https://www.coastalreview.org/2019/06/breakingdcm-objects-to-seismic-plan/ [https://perma.cc/MWN6-N3BR] (discussing the North
Carolina Division of Coastal Management’s opposition to seismic testing for feasibility
studies for offshore oil and gas drilling); Rachel Ellis, Lowcountry Mayors Sign Letter to
DHEC Opposing Seismic Testing and Offshore Drilling, ABC4NEWS (June 11, 2019),
https://abcnews4.com/news/local/lowcountry-mayors-sign-letter-to-dhec-opposingseismic-testing-and-offshore-drilling [https://perma.cc/JNV7-AP5S] (discussing a letter
from coastal mayors in SC which expresses opposition to both seismic testing and offshore
drilling); Dan Hunt, SC Places Temporary Ban On Offshore Drilling Permits, BLUFFTON
TODAY (May 31, 2019), https://www.blufftontoday.com/news/20190531/sc-placestemporary-ban-on-offshore-drilling-permits [https://perma.cc/5YKQ-WS9S] (discussing
a budget proviso in South Carolina which bans offshore drilling in the state for the next
fiscal year); Jessica Weiss, The Trump Administration Wants Offshore Drilling in Florida.
The Majority of Floridians Opposite It, WLRN (Apr. 14, 2019),
https://www.wlrn.org/post/trump-administration-wants-offshore-drilling-floridamajority-floridians-oppose-it [https://perma.cc/E3BL-UR26] (discussing opposition to
offshore drilling in Florida).
29 TORD BJORNDAL ET AL., OFFSHORE ENERGY OUTLOOK, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY
(2018),
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2017Special_Report_
OffshoreEnergyOutlook.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8HK-MHYU] [hereinafter OFFSHORE
ENERGY OUTLOOK].
30 Id.
31 Defined as oil production in waters of depths greater than 125 meters. Matthew
Manning, Offshore Oil Production in Deepwater and Ultra-Deepwater is Increasing, U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Oct.
28,
2016),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=28552 [https://perma.cc/D5BL-25X4].
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Defined as oil production at depths more than 1,500 meters. See id.
35 Id.
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Mexico resulted in a major upset in the offshore drilling industry36
and the implementation of new rules, including a European Union
(“EU”) Directive for offshore drilling safety and environmental
protection measures, 37 the IEA predicts that offshore energy activity
will increase in any projection scenario.38 Research by the IEA
further indicates that there are long-term risks related to natural gas
and oil regarding demand and stability, as well as risks associated
with a shift towards sustainable development.39 Although offshore
wind presents risks relating to policy frameworks and long-term
purchase agreements, potential solutions are quicker to develop than
oil and gas and offer fewer environmental concerns.40 Relating to
these uncertainties in the offshore energy sector, the IEA suggests
that “potential synergies” exist between various offshore energy
projects.41 The IEA further notes that there is significant potential
for the development of offshore wind along the coast of the United
States, noting that development has been slow to take off for various
reasons, including delays on leasing and regulations.42
This paper will proceed in six parts. Part I will examine the
international laws that currently regulate offshore resource
extraction, particularly related to offshore oil and gas. Part II will
examine the mechanisms employed by the European Union as a
model for successful regulation. Part III will examine the structures
regulating offshore energy development in the United States,
largely focusing on the federal laws that address areas of concern in
relation to offshore energy exploration, development, and
extraction. Part IV will discuss recent developments in the United
States ocean policy under the Obama and Trump Administrations.
Part V will propose ways that the United States could incorporate
elements of the European model of regulations into the current
regulatory scheme around offshore energy. Part VI concludes.
Id.
See generally Offshore Oil and Gas Safety, EUROPEAN COMM’N (last updated Aug.
22, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/offshore-oil-and-gassafety [https://perma.cc/JUV4-YZVM] (describing the EU’s efforts to implement safety
standards for offshore drilling following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill) [hereinafter
Offshore Oil and Gas Safety].
38 OFFSHORE ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 29, at 14–15.
39 Id. at 52.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id at 38.
36
37
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II. International and Regional Law
There are no treaties that set international standards for offshore
drilling.43 Despite the regulatory gap at the international level, some
sources of international law specifically address the regulation of
international waters. Notably, the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) defines the limits within which
nations have sovereignty and creates a framework within which
countries manage marine resources.44 Under UNCLOS, Coastal
States have sovereignty over the territorial sea, which extends out
to 12 nautical miles.45 Furthermore, beyond the territorial sea,
Coastal States have sovereignty up to 200 nautical miles in an area
known as the exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”).46 Within the EEZ,
Coastal States have sovereign rights for “exploring and exploiting,
conserving, and managing the natural resources,” which include the
production of energy.47 Coastal States exercise sovereign rights to
explore and exploit natural resources, including “mineral and other
non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living
organisms[.]”48 Coastal States have the exclusive right to authorize
and regulate drilling on the continental shelf.49 Despite the
43 Julien Rochette & Glen Wright, Brief for GSDR 2015: Strengthening the
International Regulation of Offshore Oil and Gas Activities, IDDRI SCI. PO (Feb. 14,
2014),
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5779Brief%20offshore%20GS
DR_rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TJ9-CMZ7].
44 See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
45 Id. arts. 2, 3.
46 Id. art. 55.
47 Id. art. 56.
48 Id. art. 77.
49 Id. art. 81. The continental shelf is defined as “the seabed and the subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond [the coastal state’s] territorial sea throughout the
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to
a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that
distance.” UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 76. In the United States, the “outer continental
shelf” is defined as “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands
beneath navigable waters [ ] and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United
States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control[.]” Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2017). Geologically, the continental shelf is defined as the “edge of
a continent that lies under the ocean[,]” which “extends from the coastline of a continent
to a drop-off point called the shelf break.” Kim Rutledge et al., Continental Shelf, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(Mar.
4,
2011),
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recognition of Coastal States’ sovereignty over territorial waters,
the EEZ, and the continental shelf, UNCLOS nonetheless requires
that “necessary measures” be taken by Coastal States to prevent,
reduce, and control pollution, and protect the marine environment
from harm relating to drilling or related activities.50
Beyond this recognition of sovereignty, international treaties
specifically address marine pollution.
The United Nations
Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 197351
(“MARPOL”) and the Protocol of 1978 relating to the Convention
of 1973 (“MARPOL Protocol”) create an international regulatory
regime for managing pollution from ships and offshore drilling
rigs.52 The MARPOL Protocol requires that offshore drilling rigs,
whether fixed or floating, comply with regulations such as
monitoring, record-keeping, and reporting to the Coastal State under
which the drilling rig operates.53 This notwithstanding, the onus of
implementation rests with the signatory nations.
Beyond MARPOL, the International Convention on Oil
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation of 1990
(“OPRC”) sets up measures relating to the prevention of oil
pollution for signatory nations to “prepare for and respond to an oil
pollution incident.”54
The requirements are broad, leaving
discretion to signatory nations, but establishing baseline
requirements that signatories have oil pollution plans and reporting
mechanisms, as well as encouraging international cooperation on
the matter.55 Some key provisions of OPRC require that signatory
nations require operators of offshore units to have oil pollution

https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/continental-shelf/
[https://perma.cc/N3YD-VA6X]. For purposes of this paper, the “continental shelf” will
be defined by the UNCLOS definition, which addresses the jurisdiction of coastal States
in managing their coastal areas.
50 UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 145.
51 See generally International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184.
52 See generally Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 62.
53 Id. regs. 21, 16, 17.
54 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation art. 1, Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 78 [hereinafter OPRC].
55 See id. Pmbl.
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emergency plans, 56 report oil discharge incidents,57 evaluate
discharge reports,58 create a national system for responding to
incidents,59 and cooperate with other signatory states or the
International Maritime Organization60 to respond to incidents.61
A final notable international treaty on offshore drilling is the
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic (“OSPAR”).62 OSPAR is a treaty between
fifteen countries in the North Atlantic, most of which are European,
and the EU itself.63 Decisions that are adopted by the OSPAR
Commission are legally binding on all contracting parties and are
complemented by agreements that discuss issues of importance,
programs of monitoring and data collection, guidance for
implementation, and actions taken by the OSPAR Commission.64
The OSPAR Commission publishes reports, evaluations, and
assessments of OSPAR implementation based on data reported by
contracting parties.65 Beyond the OSPAR Commission, the OSPAR
Secretariat manages and coordinates the work and reporting of
contracting parties, as well as the meeting schedule of OSPAR.66
Additional OSPAR Committees and Working Groups handle the
practical implementation of strategies and allow observer
organizations to take an active part in the process.67
Since entering into effect in 1992, the OSPAR Convention has

Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 4.
58 Id. art. 5.
59 Id. art. 6.
60 The International Maritime Organization, or IMO, is an agency within the United
Nations that acts as a “standard-setting authority for the safety, security and environmental
performance of international shipping[,]” and “create[s] a regulatory framework for the
shipping industry that is fair and effective, universally adopted and universally
implemented.”
Introduction
to
IMO,
INT’L
MAR.
ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/K93T-K7PG].
61 OPRC, supra note 54, art. 7.
62 See
generally
OSPAR
Convention,
OSPAR
COMM’N,
https://www.ospar.org/convention [https://perma.cc/YJ6Y-A8KW].
63 Id.
64 How
OSPAR Works, OSPAR COMM’N, https://www.ospar.org/about/how
[https://perma.cc/5AAZ-H7DX].
65 See id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
56
57
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developed programs and measures in “all phases of offshore oil and
gas activities[.]”68 OSPAR’s goal relating to offshore oil and gas
“is to prevent and eliminate pollution and . . . to protect . . . against
the adverse effects of offshore activities[.]”69 Data collected by
OSPAR between 2009 and 2014 show that there has been a decrease
in discharges of hydrocarbons and hazardous offshore chemicals,
despite decreasing trends in the production of oil in the OSPAR
area, continuing a pattern of successful implementation of OSPAR
measures.70 However, it is difficult to determine trends relating to
quantities of chemicals spilled, the number of oil spills, and the
quantity of oil spilled, due to the infrequent nature of spill events.71
Other OSPAR recommendations have unclear results, including a
2012 recommendation for a Risk-Based Approach to managing
water discharges, due to its short implementation time.72
OSPAR utilizes an ecosystem-based approach to evaluate the
cumulative effects of human impacts in the OSPAR area.73 OSPAR
defines the ecosystem approach as:
[T]he comprehensive integrated management of human activities
based on the best available scientific knowledge about the
ecosystem and its dynamics, to identify and take action on
influences which are critical to the health of marine ecosystems,
thereby achieving sustainable use of ecosystem goods and
services and maintenance of ecosystem integrity.74

68 See Trends in Discharges, Spills and Emissions from Offshore Oil and Gas
Installations,
OSPAR
COMM’N,
(2017),
https://oap.ospar.org/en/osparassessments/intermediate-assessment-2017/pressures-human-activities/trends-dischargesspills-and-emissions-offshore-oil-and-gas-inst/ [https://perma.cc/YM2T-SK6T].
69 Id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 Id.
73 Ecosystem Assessment Outlook – Developing an Approach to Cumulative Effects
Assessment for the QSR, OSPAR COMM’N (2017), https://oap.ospar.org/en/osparassessments/intermediate-assessment-2017/chapter-6-ecosystem-assessment-outlookdeveloping-approach-cumul/ [https://perma.cc/24XR-R9WZ] [hereinafter Ecosystem
Assessment Outlook].
74 Ecosystem
Approach,
OSPAR
COMM’N,
https://www.ospar.org/about/principles/ecosystem-approach
[https://perma.cc/RW2LEJN6] [hereinafter Ecosystem Approach].
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This ecosystem-based approach enables OSPAR to integrate
different conservation and management approaches, including
marine protected areas and existing legal frameworks.75 OSPAR
recognizes that this method of evaluation “cuts across the work of
all OSPAR committees and expert groups” and that this kind of
assessment should be “embedded within the OSPAR structural
framework and make[] best use of the available data and
expertise.”76
Although the 2017 Intermediate Assessment did not include an
evaluation of ecosystem health, OSPAR described how the next
Quality Status Report would incorporate cumulative effects
assessments based on indicators of environmental health, including
biodiversity and climate change.77 This approach will enable
OSPAR to better evaluate causal factors related to ecosystem trends
to inform OSPAR decisions.78 Specifically, OSPAR focuses on four
programmatic measurements: (1) promoting understanding and
acceptance of the ecosystem approach; (2) monitoring marine
ecosystems; (3) setting objectives for environmental quality based
on that monitoring; and (4) assessing the direct and indirect impact
of human activities on the living and non-living marine
environment.79
Beyond these treaties, there is an international push to
encourage countries to adopt maritime or marine spatial planning80
efforts as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,81
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015.82 The UNESCO
Id.
Ecosystem Assessment Outlook, supra note 73.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See Ecosystem Approach, supra note 74.
80 Throughout this paper, “maritime spatial planning” and “marine spatial planning”
will be used interchangeably. Maritime/marine spatial planning, or MSP, “works across
borders and sectors to ensure human activities at sea take place in an efficient, safe[,] and
sustainable
way.”
Maritime
Spatial
Planning,
EUR.
COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime_spatial_planning_en
[https://perma.cc/A9PE-FRP5].
81 MSPGLOBAL,
http://www.mspglobal2030.org/msp-global/
[https://perma.cc/DJ54-NFYL].
82 G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (Oct. 21, 2015). Goal 14 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
“Life Below Water,” sets various goals for the conservation and sustainable use of the
oceans, seas, and marine resources. Id. at 23–24.
75
76
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Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (“IOC-UNESCO”)
has promoted “the development of management procedures and
policies leading to the sustainability of marine environments[,]”
starting with a 2006 International Workshop on the use of marine
spatial planning “as a tool to implement ecosystem-based, sea use
management.”83 This subsequently led to the publication of
“Marine Spatial Planning: A Step by Step Approach” in 2009,
“which rapidly became an internationally-recognized standard” to
the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of marine
spatial planning (“MSP”) programs.84 The Step by Step guide
describes MSP as “a practical way to create and establish a more
rational organization of the use of marine space and the interactions
between its uses, to balance demands for development with the need
to protect marine ecosystems, and to achieve social and economic
objectives in an open and planned way.”85 The guide recognizes
that most countries already have some form of marine zone
designations based on human activities, but notes that “usually this
is done on a sector-by-sector, case-by-case basis without much
consideration of effects either on other human activities or the
marine environment[,]” leading to conflicts between different
human uses and the environment.86 The guide notes several
characteristics of effective marine spatial planning: ecosystembased, integrated, place- or area-based, adaptive, strategic and
anticipatory, and participatory.87 The broad goal is for the
development of a marine spatial plan to be a “continuing, iterative
process that learns and adapts over time”88 and to create a “futureoriented process” wherein decision makers can address different use
conflicts rather than merely react to events.89 While not a binding
legal goal, roughly seventy countries have implemented MSP
initiatives to various degrees, according to the IOC-UNESCO.90
83 MSP at IOC-UNESCO, MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING PROGRAMME, http://msp.iocunesco.org/about/msp-at-unesco/ [https://perma.cc/X8MN-4BAB].
84 Id.
85 CHARLES EHLER & FANNY DOUVERE, Marine Spatial Planning: A Step-by-Step
Approach Toward Ecosystem-Based Management 18 (2009).
86 Id. at 19.
87 Id. at 18.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 19.
90 MSP Around the Globe, MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING PROGRAMME, http://msp.iocunesco.org/world-applications/overview/ [https://perma.cc/54WW-YPJZ]. For a full list
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III. European Law
Europe has a large offshore energy market, which includes both
offshore wind and offshore drilling. The European Union has 550
offshore drilling operations91 and 105 offshore wind farms in
European waters.92 According to the IEA, the North Sea, which has
more than 300 oil and gas fields, “is at the forefront of debates about
the changing nature of offshore energy and the potential synergies
between different activities.”93 While IEA projections indicate a
shift towards investment in offshore wind, it suggests that
investment remains strong in the development of offshore oil and
gas in the region.94 The IEA notes that there are strong incentives
for governments to collaborate and for other partners to manage the
energy transition underway in the North Sea.95 Ten European
countries have committed to deploy offshore wind and promote
regional interconnections, which has encouraged industry players to
work together to develop offshore capacity and interconnections.96
Europe is one of the largest offshore wind energy producers in
the world, and its offshore wind capacity continues to grow as more
offshore wind farms are proposed and developed. In 2017, “nearly
84% (15,780 MW97) of all offshore installations” in the world were
located in the waters off the coast of eleven European countries.98
In 2018, Europe connected 409 new offshore wind turbines,
increasing its offshore energy capacity by 2,649 MW to 18,499
MW.99 Europe’s 105 offshore wind farms are connected to the grid,
representing eleven countries.100 Of the capacity installed in 2018,
of the status of marine spatial planning in countries with MSP initiatives, see Status of
MSP, MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING PROGRAMME, http://msp.ioc-unesco.org/worldapplications/status_of_msp/ [https://perma.cc/RE9N-UQ8E].
91 Offshore Oil and Gas Safety, supra note 37.
92 WINDEUROPE BUS. INTELLIGENCE, OFFSHORE WIND IN EUROPE: KEY TRENDS AND
STATISTICS 2018 8 (Colin Walsh & WindEurope eds., 2019).
93 OFFSHORE ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 29, at 57.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 MW stands for Megawatts.
98 Offshore Wind Power, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, https://gwec.net/globalfigures/global-offshore/ [https://perma.cc/5TT9-3LB8].
99 See WINDEUROPE BUS. INTELLIGENCE, supra note 92, at 7.
100 Id. at 12. These 11 countries include the UK (39); Germany (25); Denmark (14);
Belgium (7); Netherlands (6); Sweden (4); Finland (3); Spain (2); France (2); Ireland (1);
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1,651 MW (62%) of installed capacity is located in the North Sea;
395 MW (15%) of installed capacity is in the Irish Sea; 387 MW
(14%) is in the Baltic Sea; and the rest (9% or 229 MW) was
installed in the Atlantic Ocean.101
a. Energy and Environmental Goals in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU
Under Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (“TFEU”), the EU policy on energy is designed to
ensure the functioning of the energy market, ensure secure energy
supplies, promote energy efficiency, and promote the
interconnection of energy networks.102 The TFEU also mandates
that environmental protection measures should be integrated into
the definition and implementation of EU activities, particularly to
promote sustainable development.103 The TFEU specifically notes
that EU policy should “preserv[e], protect[] and improv[e] the
quality of the environment, protect[] human health, . . . and in
particular combat[] climate change.”104
The EU has several directives which relate to balancing the
goals outlined in the TFEU with offshore energy and renewable
energy targets. Within the EU, directives are binding on the
countries to which they are addressed, though Member States are
left to decide the form and means of implementation.105 The first
relevant directive is the 2008 Directive “establishing a framework
for community action in the field of marine environmental policy
(Marine Strategy Framework Directive)[.]”106 This Directive
incorporates goals from previous EU directives designed for “the
protection and conservation of the marine environment . . . with the
and Norway (1). Id.
101 Id. at 17. The UK has the majority of that installed capacity (49%), followed by
Germany (36%) and Belgium (12%). Id. at 14.
102 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
2016 O.J. (C 202) 1 [hereinafter TFEU].
103 Id. art. 11.
104 Id. art. 191.
105 Summary of Art. 288 TFEU, EUR-LEX (last updated July 11, 2018), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:l14527&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/4FCF-JAX9]; TFEU, supra note 102, art. 288.
106 Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July
2008 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Marine
Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), 2008 O.J. (L 164/19).
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overall aim of promoting sustainable use of the seas and conserving
marine ecosystems[,]”107 as well as from directives about marine
protected areas.108 The Marine Strategy Framework Directive
specifically noted that:
[b]y applying an ecosystem-based approach to the management
of human activities while enabling sustainable use of marine
goods and services, priority should be given to achieving or
maintaining good environmental status in the Community’s
marine environment, to continuing its protection and
preservation, and to preventing subsequent deterioration.109

The Marine Strategy Framework Directive goes on to describe
the goal of the Directive to create “a transparent and coherent
legislative framework,” which integrates environmental concerns
into other policies, while recognizing that regions require different
approaches.110
Subsequently, a 2014 Directive “establishing a framework for
maritime spatial planning” (“2014 MSP Directive”) entered into
force.111 The 2014 MSP Directive referenced the goals set out by
the 2008 Marine Strategy Framework Directive, including
“maritime spatial planning as a cross-cutting policy tool enabling
public authorities and stakeholders to apply a coordinated,
integrated, and trans-boundary approach[.]”112 The 2014 MSP
Directive recognizes that “[t]he application of an ecosystem-based
approach will contribute to promoting the sustainable development
and growth of the maritime and coastal economies and the
sustainable use of marine and coastal resources.”113 While the 2014
MSP Directive acknowledges that the EU can “provide a framework
for maritime spatial planning, Member States remain responsible
and competent for designing and determining, within their marine

Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 6.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July
2014 Establishing a Framework for Maritime Spatial Planning, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 135,
135.
112 Id. at 135, ¶ 3.
113 Id.
107
108
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waters, the format and content of such plans[.]”114 The deadline for
transposition of the 2014 MSP Directive was 2016; the next
deadline for EU countries to establish maritime spatial plans is
2021.115 As part of the implementation of the 2014 MSP Directive,
the EU has “launched a study on international best practices for
cross-border MSP” in collaboration with IOC-UNESCO aimed at
creating an inventory of MSP implementation in the world,
exploring four case studies, and preparing recommendations for
international cooperation on MSP.116 Three workshops arising out
of that joint effort occurred in 2018 and 2019.117
Beyond the MSP Directives, the EU has directives relating to
Europe’s energy goals. The EU adopted the 2009 Renewable
Energy Directive, which “establish[ed] an overall policy for the
production and promotion of energy from renewable sources in the
EU[,]” requiring that “the EU fulfil [sic] at least 20% of its total
energy needs with renewables by 2020” through targets set by
individual nations.118 The revised renewable energy directive,
which entered into force in December 2018, was “aimed at keeping
the EU a global leader in renewables and, more broadly, helping the
EU to meet its emissions reduction commitments under the Paris
Agreement.”119 The revised renewable energy directive “establishes
a new binding renewable energy target for the EU for 2030 of at
least 32%, with a clause for a possible upward[] revision by
2023.”120 It further requires that EU countries draft a 10-year
National Energy & Climate Plan (“NECP”) for 2021 to 2030,
“outlining how they will meet the new 2030 targets for renewable
energy and energy efficiency[,]” which must be submitted to the
European Commission by the end of 2019.121 Upon review of the
2018 draft NECPs submitted by various countries, the European
Id. at 136, ¶ 11.
Maritime
Spatial
Planning,
EUROPEAN
https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime_spatial_planning_en
[https://perma.cc/HP8B-T8R3].
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Renewable
Energy
Directive,
EUROPEAN
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energydirective/overview [https://perma.cc/5M7X-ETHD].
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
114
115

COMM’N,

COMM’N,
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Commission released an assessment of the NECPs noting that,
despite the “significant efforts” demonstrated, the plans “fall[] short
both in terms of renewables and energy efficiency contributions;”
therefore, “reaching the EU’s overall climate and energy goals will
require a collective step up of ambition.”122 Despite these
challenges, the EU remains committed to achieving its renewable
energy targets with participation from Member States and the
public.123
b. Shifts in EU Policies after the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill
The EU has responded to oil spills by passing legislation aimed
at ensuring the safety of offshore oil rigs and gas drilling. Following
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the
EU passed two measures to respond to concerns about the safety of
offshore oil rigs. The first EU response was the Commission
Decision of 19 January 2012 on setting up of the European Offshore
Oil and Gas Authorities Group (“the Commission Decision”).124
The European Offshore Oil and Gas Authorities Group (“EUOAG”)
acts as “a forum for the exchange of information and expertise
between National Authorities, Third Countries, Industrial
Associations, the European Commission and other stakeholders on
all issues relating to major accident prevention and response in
offshore oil and gas operations.”125 EUOAG prepares guidance
documents, standards and best practices, coordinates the exchange
of information about the application of national and EU policies,
and assists in monitoring the implementation of EU legislation
about offshore drilling.126 EUOAG meets at least once per year and
regularly reports on its activities, including its progress in
identifying and implementing best practices.127
122 European Commission Press Release IP/19/2993, Energy Union: Commission
Calls on Member States to Step Up Ambition in Plans to Implement Paris Agreement (June
18, 2019).
123 Id.
124 See generally Commission Decision of 19 January 2012 on Setting up of the
European Union Offshore Oil and Gas Authorities Group, 2012 O.J. (C 18) 8 [hereinafter
Commission Decision].
125 EU Offshore Authorities Group, EUROPEAN COMM’N, (June 6, 2018),
https://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ [https://perma.cc/6V29-K5KC].
126 Id.
127 Commission Decision, supra note 124, art. 5.
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The second EU response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was
Directive 2013/30/EU on the safety of offshore oil and gas
operations (“the Offshore Directive”) to counter concerns about the
safety of offshore drilling rigs and the potential for offshore
pollution.128 The Offshore Directive recognized that the fragmented
regulatory framework applying to offshore drilling within the EU
did not adequately protect against those threats.129 To resolve these
deficiencies, it directed that offshore operators reduce the risk of a
major accident as “reasonably practicable, to the point where the
cost of further risk reduction would be grossly disproportionate to
the benefits[,]”130 and specifically ensured that the public would be
able to participate in decision-making.131 The Offshore Directive
further directed that Member States incorporate best practices into
their regulatory schemes to prevent major accidents, while limiting
the consequences for human life and health as well as the
environment.132 Moreover, it directs Member States to prevent
conflicts of interest between regulatory functions relating to safety
and the environment, and those relating to the economics of
offshore drilling.133 Upon the passage of the Offshore Directive,
Member States had time to integrate the goals of the directive into
their national regulatory framework.134 The Offshore Directive
gave Member States until July 19, 2018 to apply the laws,
regulations, and administrative provisions included within the
Directive to existing oil and gas installations.135
In August 2018, the European Commission released a report on
the safety of offshore oil and gas operations in the EU for 2016
(“Annual Report”) as part of its evaluation of the Directive.136 In
the Annual Report, Member States report information using a
128 See generally Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 June 2013 on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations and Amending
Directive 2004/35/EC, 2013 (L 178) 66 [hereinafter 2013 Directive].
129 Id. at 67, ¶ 9.
130 Id. at 67, ¶ 14.
131 Id. art. 5.
132 Id. art. 3.
133 Id. at 68, ¶ 20.
134 2013 Directive, supra note 128, arts. 41–42.
135 Id. art. 42.
136 Annual Report on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the European
Union for the Year 2016, COM (2018) 595 final (Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Annual
Report].
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common format to evaluate major hazard indicators including the
number, type, location, and age of offshore oil and gas installations,
and the number of offshore inspections, investigations, enforcement
actions, and incidents on offshore rigs.137 The Annual Report
showed that two EU Member States had not yet completely
integrated the Offshore Directive.138 According to the Annual
Report, only ten reportable enforcement actions or convictions were
carried out by Member State authorities in 2016, though Member
State authorities have regularly inspected offshore rigs in their
jurisdiction under the Offshore Directive.139 The Annual Report
also indicates that only two Member States carried out
investigations for serious incidents during 2016, though other less
serious enforcement actions including improvement notices were
taken by three Member States.140 Unfortunately, the Annual Report
was the first produced under the Offshore Directive and no
comparisons could be made to preceding years to reveal trends. The
Commission nonetheless concluded that the offshore oil and gas
industry was operating within an adequate margin of safety.141
As of 2018, the transitional period for Member States to
integrate the goals of the Directive into their laws has been
completed and oil companies should have completed their
implementation of the new safety rules.142 Companies have been
able to submit their feedback on the new rules and the EU is
evaluating that feedback.143 Publicly available feedback from five
companies and business associations in the EU provides some
insight into industry response to the Offshore Directive.144 A
Id. § 3.
138 Id. § 4.2. The Annual Report does not specifically name the two Member States
that have not completely integrated the Offshore Directive. Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Annual Report, supra note 136, § 6.
142 Robert Hodgson, Offshore Oil Facing Countdown to Comply with New EU Safety
Rules, EURACTIV (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/frioffshore-oil-facing-countdown-to-comply-with-new-eu-safety-rules/
[https://perma.cc/B6Q4-ZCL3].
143 Evaluation of the Directive on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations,
EUROPEAN COMM’N (last updated Aug. 20, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/betterregulation/initiatives/ares-2018-2361494 [https://perma.cc/UL8L-JLYW].
144 See Feedback Received on Evaluation of the Directive on Offshore Oil and Gas
Operations, EUROPEAN COMM’N
(2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/betterregulation/initiatives/ares-2018-2361494/feedback_en?p_id=228837
137
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recurring theme in the feedback is concerns about liability and
compensation for offshore accidents. As of August 2019, the final
evaluation of the Offshore Directive has not yet been released,
though the roadmap to implementation indicates that the evaluation
is due in the third quarter of 2019.145
IV. United States Laws and Regulations
The IEA notes in its Offshore Energy Outlook report that the
United States has a high potential for the development of offshore
wind.146 Relating to offshore oil and gas production, the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) forecasted that the Gulf of
Mexico region will set a record high in oil production in 2018, a
trend which it predicts will continue through 2024.147
a. Federal Laws Regulating Offshore Oil and Gas
Exploration
Within the United States, all offshore energy is broadly
governed by a complex set of statutes covering the continental shelf
and coastal zone, as well as by environmental statutes and various
agency regulations.148 It is a complicated scheme that attempts to
balance various state and federal interests, including navigation,
energy, and environmental protection. The primary statute is the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”),149 which grants the
Secretary of the Interior the authority to administer mineral
exploration and development on the outer continental shelf.150
Additional statutes, including the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,151 the

[https://perma.cc/U36N-HNBR].
145 Id.
146 OFFSHORE ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 29.
147 BLAKE A. ZERINGUE ET AL., U.S. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., OCS REPORT
BOEM 2017-082, OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION FORECAST: 2018-2027 (Dec. 2017),
https://www.boem.gov/BOEM-2017-082/ [https://perma.cc/G9YL-FAY7].
148 See generally U.S. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., Federal Offshore Lands,
https://www.boem.gov/Federal-Offshore-Lands/ [https://perma.cc/25N3-RC4W]; see
also JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33705, OIL SPILLS:
BACKGROUND AND GOVERNANCE (2017) [hereinafter RAMSEUR].
149 See generally Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356(b)
(2017).
150 Id. § 1333.
151 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2720 (2017).
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Clean Water Act,152 the Clean Air Act,153 the Coastal Zone
Management Act,154 and various statutes regarding pipelines, cover
other aspects of oil drilling, extraction, and transportation.155 The
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) “amended the Clean Water Act
and addressed the wide range of problems associated with
preventing, responding to, and paying for oil pollution incidents in
navigable waters of the United States.”156 OPA was enacted after
the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in 1989 and “made comprehensive
changes to U.S. oil pollution law by expanding federal response
authority and increasing spill liability.”157
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972158 (“CZMA”) was
“designed to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to
restore or enhance, the resources of the nation’s coastal zone for this
and succeeding generations[,]”159 and “to encourage and assist the
states to exercise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone
through the development and implementation of management
programs to achieve wise use of the land and water resources of the
coastal zone[.]”160 CZMA requires that any federal actions and
federally submitted projects, even those within exclusively federal
waters, must be submitted for state review to ensure compliance
with that state’s programs for managing its coastal zones.161 The
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) is
responsible for administering CZMA.162 The specific programs
created by CZMA and overseen by NOAA work to address different
concerns of coastal zone management: (1) balancing competing
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1275 (2017).
153 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2017).
154 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452–1466 (2017).
155 See generally RAMSEUR, supra note 148.
156 Oil
Pollution
Act
of
1990
(OPA),
U.S.
COAST
GUARD,
https://www.uscg.mil/Mariners/National-Pollution-Funds-Center/About_NPFC/opa/
[https://perma.cc/Q2C7-7M43].
157 RAMSEUR, supra note 148, at 4.
158 Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2017).
159 Id. § 1452(1).
160 Id. § 1452(2).
161 ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33404, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 13 (2018) [hereinafter VANN].
162 Coastal
Zone Management Act, OFFICE FOR COASTAL MGMT.,
https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/act/ [https://perma.cc/5FYL-VFZM] [hereinafter Coastal Zone
Management Act].
152
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issues; (2) providing research on the human impact of estuaries; and
(3) protecting threatened coastal and estuarine lands through
partnerships with state and local governments.163
Many other federal laws incorporate various concerns relating
to the use of the ocean for human purposes, including oil extraction
and navigation.164 Some laws which may affect leasing and offshore
energy activities include: the Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”),165
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”),166 and the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).167 The RHA generally prohibits
obstructions to navigable waters.168 The MMPA prohibits the
“take” of marine mammals in U.S. waters and by U.S. citizens on
the high seas.169 Similarly, the ESA “prohibits any person subject
to U.S. jurisdiction from ‘taking’ any endangered species within the
territorial sea or on the high sea[,]” including through “significant
habitat modifications that kill or injure listed species by altering
their essential behavior patterns.”170
The National Marine
Sanctuaries Act (“NMSA”) may also affect the availability of
offshore lands for leasing. NSMA “identif[ies] and designate[s] . . .
areas of the marine environment which are of special national
significance[,]” including areas that “possess conservation,
recreational, ecological, historical, scientific, educational, cultural,
archaeological, or [a]esthetic qualities which give them special
national, and in some instances, international, significance.”171
Additionally, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
applies to any proposed major federal action and requires that all
branches of government include a detailed statement about the
environmental impact of the action, known as an Environmental
Impact Analysis (EIS), among other environmental considerations,

Id.
164 For more information about the legal regime controlling ocean jurisdictions, see
generally U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, REVIEW OF U.S. OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW:
THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE OVER THREE DECADES (2004) [hereinafter
REVIEW OF U.S. OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW].
165 Id. at 108.
166 Id. at 35.
167 Id. at 38.
168 Id. at 108.
169 Id. at 35.
170 REVIEW OF U.S. OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW, supra note 164, at 38.
171 Id. at 121.
163
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before moving forward with the proposed action.172 EIS under
NEPA would occur at various stages of offshore energy
development, including during the lease sales, exploration,
development, and production stages of the process.173
b. State Laws Affecting Offshore Energy Development
The CZMA specifically gives states the task of “directly
implementing the national coastal management program through
coastal programs developed at the state level[]” based on “[t]he
premise . . . that state and local governments can most effectively
manage human activities because historically they have had primary
jurisdiction over land use of non-federal property.”174 As a result of
this requirement by CZMA, “99 percent of the nation’s marine and
Great Lakes coasts are governed by state coastal management
programs; thirty-four out of thirty-five coastal and Great Lakes
states . . . have federally-approved coastal management
programs.”175 The result is that states are granted “the flexibility to
adopt the management approach for the coastal zone most
compatible with the state’s general process of land use regulation
and management[,]” although the state programs are “subject to
continuing review by NOAA to determine the extent to which the
state is implementing and enforcing the program” and a state’s
program may be suspended or withdrawn under certain
circumstances.176
Through CZMA, the state-level laws that are part of “a state’s
federally approved coastal management program[]”177 may impact
the ability of the President to push forward any offshore energy
development through the grant of federal licenses and permits.
“Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that
affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone”
must be “consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2017).
See generally VANN, supra note 161 (explaining the various stages of offshore
energy development, along with the accompanying environmental impact).
174 REVIEW OF U.S. OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW, supra note 164, at 20.
175 Id. The only non-participating Coastal or Great Lakes state is Illinois. Id. The U.S.
territories of Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam,
and the American Samoa also have federally-approved coastal management programs. Id.
176 Id. at 21.
177 Id. at 22.
172
173
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enforceable policies of approved [s]tate management programs.”178
Federal agency activities include “development projects carried out
by a federal agency, federal license or permit activities, and federal
financial assistance to state and local governments.”179 An applicant
for a federal lease under OCLSA “must certify to the relevant state
coastal management program that any activities described . . . will
be conducted in a manner consistent with the enforceable policies
of the state’s program.”180 Federal consistency is determined by the
“reasonably foreseeable effects on the coastal zone” on a case-bycase basis.181
Beyond the CZMA regime, additional state laws and regulations
may impact the possibility of offshore energy exploration and
development, such as state environmental policy acts, which may
require environmental impact analyses much like NEPA.182
Considering the broad, bipartisan opposition to offshore drilling by
coastal states,183 state regulations offer an opportunity for coastal
states to make determinations regarding exploration, development,
and management of adjacent coastal waters. Within the state’s
territorial waters,184 that “state has sole jurisdiction to issue leases
and permits for oil and gas extraction, but the [lease] applicant has
to meet the requirements of the state’s coastal zone management
program,” and additional requirements by other federal and state
agencies under other legal authorities.185

16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A) (2017).
179 REVIEW OF U.S. OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW, supra note 164, at 21–22.
180 Id. at 24.
181 Id. at 21.
182 See generally States and Local Jurisdictions with NEPA-like Environmental
Planning Requirements, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY https://ceq.doe.gov/lawsregulations/states.html [https://perma.cc/843L-AJVJ] (listing jurisdictions which have
additional environmental review requirements under state or local law).
183 See Jones, supra note 18.
184 Generally, a state’s jurisdiction extends three geographic miles from the state’s
coast. VANN, supra note 161, at 2. United States’ seaward jurisdiction is established by the
Submerged Lands Act. REVIEW OF U.S. OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW, supra note 164, at 13.
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 “gives states the authority to manage, develop, and
lease the natural resources throughout the water column and on and under the seabed[,]”
in the zone “extending 3 miles seaward from the baseline” established by that state. Id.
The baseline is typically the mean high tide line. Id. at n. 57. The Gulf coast boundaries of
Texas and Florida extend to the three-marine-league limit. Id.
185 REVIEW OF U.S. OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW, supra note 164, at 3.
178

96

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLV

V.

Offshore Energy Developments Under the Obama and
Trump Administrations
Since 2008, the United States has experienced a surge in
offshore energy production in large part due to the increasing
presence of offshore wind and oil along the Gulf and Atlantic
coasts.186 While the Obama and Trump Administrations have
employed different approaches to the issue, the ongoing need for oil
and gas and the projected growth in the United States’ oil and gas
exports in the future187 suggest that these issues will continue even
while President Trump’s expansion of offshore drilling is delayed
in courts. Furthermore, offshore wind is a growing industry in the
United States188 as more states move to increase their offshore wind
capacity, raising concerns related to balancing competing interests.
a. Obama Administration (2009 - 2017)
President Obama attempted to address the regulatory gaps in
long-term planning for offshore energy development and
management by directing an interagency task force to “develop[]
recommendations to enhance our ability to maintain healthy,
resilient, and sustainable ocean, coasts, and Great Lakes resources
for the benefit of present and future generations.”189 The
Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force (“IOPTF”) “reviewed
Federal, State, and foreign policies and models, past and pending
legislation, the recommendations contained in the two earlier Ocean
Commission’s reports, and public comments[,]” and “initiated a
robust public engagement process to receive input from a diversity

186 See Terry Yen, EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2019 Projects Growing Oil, Natural
Gas, Renewables Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38112 [https://perma.cc/D56E-6ZYE].
187 See id.; see also Terry Yen, The United States is Expected to Export More Energy
Than It Imports by 2020, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38152 [https://perma.cc/GJ82-ABZN].
188 See, e.g., Eric Niiler, Offshore Wind Farms Are Spinning Up in the US – At Last,
WIRED (Apr. 17, 2019, 1:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/offshore-wind-farms-arespinning-up-in-the-us-at-last/ [https://perma.cc/EX53-5TNA] (describing the Vineyard
Wind offshore wind project in Massachusetts and the growth of the offshore wind energy
throughout the United States).
189 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERAGENCY
OCEAN
POLICY
TASK
FORCE
(2010),
https://www.nsf.gov/geo/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/nov2010/optf_finalrecs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8K6-PKQW] [hereinafter FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE IOPTF].
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of voices across the country.”190 Following this process and their
analysis, the IOPTF recommended the creation of national priorities
regarding ocean management, including conservation, resiliency,
science-backed decision-making, and scientific research, creating a
“comprehensive national approach to . . . ocean stewardship.”191
To implement this national ocean policy, the IOPTF
recommended several steps, including creating a new National
Ocean Council (“NOC”); formally engaging with state, tribal, and
local authorities by creating a committee of their representatives;
and strengthening the coordination between the NOC and other
White House agencies that deal with national security, economics,
and the environment.192 IOPTF further recommended priority
objectives to include ecosystem-based management, coastal and
marine spatial planning, public education, and coordination
between different levels of government.193
Following the
publication of IOPTF’s Final Recommendations, President Obama
issued EO 13,547, titled “Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts,
and the Great Lakes,” in which he directed executive agencies to
implement those recommendations under the guidance of a NOC.194
In 2016, the NOC finalized ocean plans and released two regional
plans to “promote the use of integrated ocean data and best practices
for informed and efficient management of the Nation’s shared
marine resources.”195
b. Recent Federal Developments Evaluating Potential
Environmental Impacts of Offshore Drilling
Since the Trump Administration announced its decision in
January 2018196 to open up leasing to offshore oil and gas drilling,
the federal government has begun the process of opening up these
Id. at 2.
191 Id. at 3.
192 Id. at 4.
193 Id. at 3.
194 Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023 (Jul. 22, 2010). This Executive Order
was revoked by Executive Order 13,840. Exec. Order No. 13,840, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,431,
29,433 (June 22, 2018).
195 Christy Goldfuss & John P. Holdren, The Nation’s First Ocean Plans, THE WHITE
HOUSE – PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Dec. 7, 2016, 9:02 AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/12/07/nations-first-ocean-plans
[https://perma.cc/NTF9-8ATR].
196 See Friedman, supra note 1.
190
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federal leasing areas to offshore oil development. In August 2018,
BOEM and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
(“BSEE”) released a Draft Programmatic Environmental
Assessment for Federally Regulated Offshore Oil and Gas
Activities in the Southern California Planning Area (“PEA”) to
“evaluate the potential environmental impacts of continued BSEE
review and approval of permitted oil and gas activities on the
[Pacific Outer Continental Shelf].”197 In the PEA, BOEM and
BSEE determine that the air quality impacts of the proposed action
and alternatives would be minor or nonexistent.198 Additionally, the
PEA concludes that there are negligible impacts for the proposed
action and alternatives in terms of “cumulative impacts on regional
air quality or climate change[] when combined with other ongoing
or possible future emissions.”199 Finally, the PEA concludes that
the effects on water quality would likewise be minor to nonexistent
for the proposed action and alternatives, and that there would be no
cumulative impacts on water quality.200
In June 2018, President Trump revoked the Obama
Administration’s EO 13,547 through EO 13,840.201 EO 13,840
shifted the direction of the ocean policy for the United States.202 In
EO 13,840, President Trump focused on the economic impact of
ocean industries and the importance of federal waters in the United
States’ security interests including defense and energy.203 Although
some of the policy recommendations of EO 13,840 echo those
present in the IOPTF recommendations, there is a distinct shift
towards encouraging economic development of marine
environment and emphasizing the strategic use of United States
waters. One such directive, similar to that in the IOPTF

197 ARGONNE NAT’L LAB., PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR
FEDERALLY REGULATED OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
PLANNING AREA ES-1 (Aug. 2018).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 4-9.
200 Id. at 3-5.
201 Id.
202 Maya Wei-Haas, Trump Just Remade Ocean Policy – Here’s What That Means,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(July
13,
2018),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/07/news-ocean-policyindigenous-sustainability-fisheries-industry-economy-marine
[https://perma.cc/4PHCY4WV].
203 See Exec. Order 13,840, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,431 (June 22, 2018).

2019

REGULATING OFFSHORE ENERGY

99

recommendations, is for the United States’ ocean policy to
“modernize the acquisition, distribution, and use of the best
available ocean-related science and knowledge, in partnership with
marine industries; [s]tate, tribal, and local governments; and other
ocean stakeholders, to inform decisions and enhance
entrepreneurial opportunity . . . .”204 Much like the EO 13,547
development of the NOC, EO 13,840 establishes an interagency
Ocean Policy Committee (“OPC”) to “ensure appropriate
coordination by Federal agencies on ocean-related matters.”205
Another similarity between the two directives is in the regional
ocean management plans encouraged by the IOPTF
recommendations, although the two plans differ in this requirement
due to the voluntary component of those regional plans.206 EO
13,840 removed the regional planning bodies operating under EO
13,547, choosing instead to rely on “voluntarily formed Regional
Ocean Partnerships.”207 EO 13,840 enables the OPC to “engage and
collaborate, under existing laws and regulations, with stakeholders,
including regional ocean partnerships, to address ocean-related
matters that may require interagency or intergovernmental
solutions[.]”208 It also grants the OPC the right to “obtain
information and advice concerning ocean-related matters from[]
State, tribal, and local governments; and private-sector entities and
individuals.”209
On June 28, 2018, the Executive Office of the President released
a memorandum from the Council on Environmental Quality
(“CEQ”) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(“OSTP”) as guidance for executives to implement EO 13,840.210
Id. § 2.
Id. § 4.
206 See generally id., §§ 3, 5 (Trump’s Exec. Order relies on voluntarily formed
partnerships); Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023 (Obama’s Exec. Order
requiring participation, repealed by Trump’s Exec. Order No. 13840) (July 22, 2010).
207 Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump is Promoting America’s Ocean Economy,
THE WHITE HOUSE (June 19, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-promoting-americas-ocean-economy/
[https://perma.cc/T2UG-GUXD].
208 Exec. Order No. 13,840, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,431, § 5 (June 22, 2018).
209 Id.
210 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE
ORDER 13840, TITLED “OCEAN POLICY TO ADVANCE THE ECONOMIC, SECURITY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/20180628EO13840OceanPolicyGuidance.pdf
204
205
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The guidance document instructs agencies to submit points of
contact for the OPC by July 5, 2018; to complete internal reviews
of existing regulations, guidance, and policies to ensure compliance
with the EO by September 17, 2018; and to continue collaboration
with regional ocean partnerships.211 A meeting summary of the
OPC’s August 1, 2018 meeting further elaborates on
implementation actions taken by the Committee.212 The OPC
established subcommittees on Ocean Resource Management
(“ORM”) and Ocean Science and Technology (“OST”),213 similar
to the subcommittees previously housed under the NOC.214 The
OPC directed the science subcommittee, the OST, to:
[A]ddress research and technology issues across agencies, . . .
includ[ing] identifying priority ocean research and technology
needs, participating as appropriate in the work of the National
Oceanographic Partnership Program (NOPP), and supporting
research and technology collaboration among the agencies and
departments represented on the OPC.215

The OPC tasked the ORM with “address[ing] regulatory and
policy coordination associated with ocean management, including
through engagement with regional ocean partnerships (ROPs) and
stakeholders[,]” and “coordinat[ing] the timely public release of
unclassified ocean-related data and other information.”216
The guidance document for implementation of EO 13,840 and
the meeting summary both indicate the Trump Administration’s
embrace of regional ocean partnerships even as it rejects the
mandate that federal agencies follow regional policies.217 These
[https://perma.cc/BGU7-8DHD] [hereinafter GUIDANCE].
211 Id.
212 OCEAN POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING SUMMARY, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 1,
2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/OPC-Summary-InitialMeeting-080118.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B48-T5HD] [hereinafter OPC MEETING
SUMMARY].
213 Id.
214 See Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023, § 4 (July 22, 2010).
215 Id.
216 OPC MEETING SUMMARY, supra note 212.
217 See generally GUIDANCE, supra note 210 (discussing implementation for Exec.
Order No. 13,840); OPC MEETING SUMMARY, supra note 212 (summarizing the actions
that at the Ocean Policy Committee’s August 1, 2018 meeting).
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regional partnerships existed before both President Obama’s EO
13,547 and President Trump’s EO 13,840. Regional ocean
partnerships developed along the East Coast to encourage
collaboration between coastal states. For example, in New England,
the Northeast Regional Ocean Council (“NROC”), formed in 2005,
“is a state and federal partnership that facilitates the New England
states, federal agencies, regional organizations, and other interested
regional groups in addressing ocean and coastal issues that benefit
from a regional response.”218 NROC was formed by the governors
of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and Connecticut.219 The Mid-Atlantic Regional Council on the
Ocean (“MARCO”), formed in 2009, functions in much the same
way as NROC.220 MARCO was formed by the governors of New
York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia.221
Besides NROC and MARCO, the South Atlantic states of
Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina were
previously involved in the “Governor’s South Atlantic Alliance,”
which was created in 2009 “to further the collaboration of the four
Member States . . . and their partners on shared ocean and coastal
challenges and opportunities while promoting environmental
sustainability, disaster preparedness, and strong economies.”222 The
Governor’s South Atlantic Alliance ceased operating in 2016.223
Although, at that time “members [were] evaluating existing regional
collaboration opportunities and the potential for restructuring the
organization based upon lessons learned, to maintain and build upon
the partnerships and successes achieved by the Alliance over the
past five years[,]”224 no such successor organization has emerged in
the South Atlantic.
In the time since President Trump issued EO 13,840, the two
remaining regional ocean partnerships, NROC and MARCO, have
218 About, NE. REG’L OCEAN COUNCIL, https://www.northeastoceancouncil.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/WKQ5-6S9R].
219
Id.
220 See
MARCO Overview, MID-ATL. REG’L COUNCIL ON THE OCEAN,
http://midatlanticocean.org/about/marco-overview/ [https://perma.cc/UH8N-SNTF].
221 Id.
222 Message from GSAA Leadership, GOVERNORS’ S. ATL. ALL. (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://southatlanticalliance.org/message-from-gsaa-leadership/ [https://perma.cc/9GWA2K9E].
223 See id.
224 Id.
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continued their efforts to engage in collaboration regardless of
changes to federal agency engagement. MARCO released a
statement on June 27, 2018, stating that “MARCO is ready and
willing to keep moving ahead as the Mid-Atlantic’s State-led
Regional Ocean Partnership to coordinate and collaborate on issues
of shared regional concern.”225 On December 20, 2018, MARCO
sent a letter to NOAA and BOEM expressing its opposition to the
proposed 2019-2024 National OCS Program and seismic testing
associated with oil and gas exploration or development along their
waters.226 MARCO also hosted an ocean planning forum on March
20, 2019, discussing ocean planning and management issues which
affect its work.227 On December 6, 2018, the NROC sent a letter to
the Co-Chairs and the Executive Director of the OPC requesting that
the OPC “collaborate with NROC and mobilize federal agency
capacity to advance . . . regional ocean management priorities,
which have been identified and reaffirmed through extensive
engagement with stakeholders.”228 Subsequently, the NROC reestablished their own Ocean Planning Committee (“NROC-OPC”)
to “support and coordinate activities related to ocean planning in
New England.”229 The NROC has noted “four strategies for
working towards its goal to support and coordinate ocean
planning[,]” including: (1) providing a regional forum for offshore
225 MARCO to Provide Forum for Regional Coordination on Ocean Management,
MID-ATL.
REG’L
COUNCIL
ON
THE
OCEAN
(June
27,
2018),
https://midatlanticocean.org/marco-to-provide-forum-for-regional-coordination-andcollaboration-on-ocean-management/ [https://perma.cc/2APB-RVPE].
226 See Letter from Elizabeth Semple, MARCO Mgmt Bd. Chair, to Donna Wieting,
Dir. Fisheries Office of Protected Res., NOAA & Kelly Hammerle, Nat’l Program
Manager, U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt. (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://midatlanticocean.org/marco-delivers-letter-opposing-seismic-testing-permits/
[https://perma.cc/KDU2-7XTU].
227 Mid-Atlantic Ocean Forum 2019: Advancing Intergovernmental Collaboration
and
Ocean
Planning,
MID-ATL. REG’L COUNCIL ON THE OCEAN,
https://midatlanticocean.org/mid-atlantic-ocean-forum-advancing-intergovernmentalcollaboration-ocean-planning/ [https://perma.cc/D5JC-HKCW].
228 Letter from Steve Couture, Adm’r, Coastal Program of N.H. Dep’t of Envr. Servs.,
to Ocean Policy Comm. Co-Chairs (Dec. 6, 2018), https://neoceanplanning.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/NROC-Letter-to-CEQ-OSTP-12-6-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J9C3-GWJ8].
229 NROC Ocean Planning Committee – Draft 2019-2020 Work Plan, NE. REG’L
OCEAN
COUNCIL,
https://neoceanplanning.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/NROC_OPC_WorkPlan_20192020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4BVW-B2D3].
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planning and management; (2) developing data products
characterizing human activities, natural and cultural resources; (3)
enhancing existing regulatory and management processes using best
available information, cross-jurisdiction coordination, preapplication consultations, and public engagement; and (4)
determining the long-term capacity and funding needs to support the
NROC’s activities and regional coordination.230 Since releasing
these plans, NROC hosted an NROC-OPC meeting in June 2019
where the issues discussed included offshore wind, federal
regulatory changes, federal environmental review for offshore
wind, and the co-existence of sustainable fisheries and offshore
wind.231
In February 2019, both the OST and ORM subcommittees under
the OPC released their initial work plans to continue
implementation of EO 13,840.232 The OST Workplan explains that,
although other entities and reports have already been created which
“address priority ocean-related research and technology needs
relevant to or developed by government, industry, and
academia[,]”233 the goals of OST’s research are different:
OST action is not intended to replicate these efforts. Rather, it will
identify research priorities that reflect interagency
recommendations, present near-term opportunities, and support
Administration policies. The OST will prioritize ocean-related
research and technology needs across the OPC agencies guided
by and consistent with existing policy and specific direction
established by EO 13,840.234

That is to say, the OST’s research is meant to support the Trump
See id.
231 See generally Presentations from the June 4 NROC Ocean Planning Committee
Meeting,
NE.
OCEAN
PLANNING
COUNCIL,
https://neoceanplanning.org/news/presentations-from-the-june-4-nroc-ocean-planningcommittee-meeting/ [https://perma.cc/Q6CK-9V22] (providing slideshow presentations
from NROC Ocean Planning Committee Meeting for Offshore Wind in the Northeast).
232 Initiatives,
COUNCIL
ON
ENVTL.
QUALITY,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/initiatives/ [https://perma.cc/B5ZL-CCJ6] [hereinafter
Initiatives].
233 OCEAN POLICY COMM. OCEAN RES. MGMT. SUBCOMM., WORKPLAN TO IDENTIFY
AND PUBLISH FEDERAL GEOSPATIAL DATA 1 (2019) [hereinafter OPC-ORM, WORKPLAN].
234 Id.
230
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Administration’s goal of increasing offshore drilling. The first
phase of OST’s Workplan was to identify priority research and
technology needs by March 2019; the second phase was meant to
identify and prioritize projects supporting agency research and
technology needs by May 2019; the third and final phase was to
develop recommendations for implementation by July 2019.235 The
ORM’s Workplan, in contrast, states that ORM “will address
regulatory and policy coordination associated with ocean
management, including through engagement with regional ocean
partnerships and stakeholders.”236 This “include[s] addressing data
and information needs and other ocean-related matters that may
require interagency or intergovernmental coordination.”237 To
accomplish this goal, the ORM will first “develop and implement a
plan to identify and publish Federal geospatial data that addresses
regionally identified data needs.”238 This first phase of ORM’s
Workplan, completed in November 2018, was to identify regional
data needs;239 the next phase was to identify and review agency data
availability by March 2019;240 and the third and final phase was to
develop and implement the data plan.241 The data plan was
supposed to be completed by July 2019 with implementation from
October 2019 forward.242 As of September 2019, no plan had been
released and the status of implementation was unclear.243
Since the initial workplans released in February 2019, the OPC
has released a summary of its June 12, 2019 meeting including
updates of both the ORM and the OST subcommittees.244
According to the meeting summary, the ORM, in conjunction with
both federal and non-federal stakeholders, has “identified regional
data needs and explored opportunities to streamline the release of
Id.
Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 OPC-ORM, WORKPLAN, supra note 233.
240 Id. at 2.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 See Initiatives, supra note 232.
244 OCEAN POLICY COMM. MEETING SUMMARY, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 12, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/20190626FINAL-OPC-June12-Meeting-Summary-CLEAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPP6-6WBB] [hereinafter OPC
MEETING SUMMARY].
235
236
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Federal data” and “is working to compile the draft data report to
provide to the OPC in July 2019.”245 Meanwhile, the OST
subcommittee has identified “three main themes” to the ocean
science and technology research needs of OPC agencies, including:
(1) forecasting the physical and biological coastal environment; (2)
exploring the unknown ocean; and (3) inspiring next-generation
ocean technology.246 According to the meeting summary, the
compilation of the projects and recommendations should have been
provided to the OPC in July 2019.247
As part of the Trump Administration’s efforts to encourage
offshore oil and gas development and exploration, the
Administration is attempting to remove the regulations adopted
after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill under the Obama
Administration related to safety measures on offshore oil rigs.248
The House Energy and Commerce Committee has requested an
investigation of this attempt to roll back safety measures through
the Government Accountability Office, claiming that the rollback
of those safety regulations “may increase the risk of another
catastrophic spill.”249 Environmental groups sued, claiming that
“the Trump [A]dministration did not provide adequate justification
for scaling back rules that were previously found to improve the
245 Id. As of October 1, 2019, the draft data report is not available on the White House
Initiatives website. Initiatives, supra note 232.
246 OPC MEETING SUMMARY, supra note 244. As of October 1, 2019, the draft data
report is not available on the White House Initiatives website. Initiatives, supra note 232.
247 Id.
248 See Associated Press, Trump Eases Regulations Adopted After BP Deepwater
Horizon
Disaster,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
2,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/02/trump-eases-regulationsadopted-after-bp-deepwater-horizon-disaster [https://perma.cc/6MDA-8NJU]; see also
Lisa Friedman & Hiroko Tabuchi, U.S. to Roll Back Safety Rules Created After Deepwater
Horizon
Spill,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
28,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/us/trump-offshore-drilling.html
[https://perma.cc/4YRV-EW84] (describing the initial proposal by BSEE to reverse
Obama-era regulations as part of the Trump Administration’s efforts to ease restrictions
on oil and gas companies). The proposed rule can be found at: Oil and Gas and Sulfur
Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf — Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control
Revisions, Proposed Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 22,128 (May 11, 2018) (to be codifed at 30 C.F.R.
at pt. 250).
249 Rebecca Beitsch, House Democrats Push Investigation of Trump Rollback of
Offshore Drilling Regs, THE HILL (Aug. 5, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/energyenvironment/456233-house-dems-push-investigation-of-trump-rollback-of-offshore
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safety of offshore drilling for both rig workers and the
environment.”250
VI. Recommendations
While it is difficult to make direct comparisons between the
regulatory regimes of the United States and Europe, it is clear that
the regulatory gaps at the international level have the potential to
leave significant differences between countries. Internationally,
jurisdiction over coastal waters is left to Coastal States bordering
those waters.251 To the extent that the international regime
encourages the sustainable management of coastal waters, efforts to
encourage sustainable development and management are nonbinding in nature, and encompassing UN resolutions about
sustainable ocean management are still ongoing. Further nonbinding efforts by UNESCO, to encourage marine spatial planning
as a method of accomplishing the 2030 Agenda for sustainable
development, give Member States a recommended system to
develop and implement their own MSP initiatives.
Regionally, the OSPAR Convention, while lacking enforcement
mechanisms, offers a collaborative system which focuses on
evaluating various measures of success and incorporates a scheme
wherein marine spatial planning is an essential ingredient of a
regional system to managing the shared ocean waters. Evaluating
best practices alongside specific metrics of ocean health, while
incorporating the future-looking marine spatial planning regime,
provides a mechanism for States and interested stakeholders to
frequently evaluate the progress towards shared management goals.
Through the regional-based OSPAR Convention, Europe has
achieved success with reducing the discharge of pollutants from
offshore drilling rigs and has begun the process of creating a more
ecosystem-based approach to evaluate the impacts on specific goals
of the OSPAR Convention. Europe’s willingness to collaborate
with neighboring countries and its broader geographic region, while
holding itself accountable to a board outside of the EU, is a
250 Id.; see also Valerie Volcovici, Green Groups Sue Trump Administration for
Gutting
Offshore
Oil
Safety
Rules,
REUTERS
(June
11,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oil-safety-lawsuit/green-groups-sue-trumpadministration-for-gutting-offshore-oil-safety-rules-idUSKCN1TC20C
[https://perma.cc/M6SV-P3VG] (describing the lawsuit challenging the rollback of
offshore drilling regulations filed by Earthjustice and other environmental groups).
251 UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 55.
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framework which the United States should adopt.
The strengths of the European Union system are largely focused
on the collaborative nature of European law and the focus on
delineating specific goals in sustainable management, development,
and environmental goals. This collaborative regulatory system,
wherein Member States incorporate EU directives into the internal
regulatory scheme of their States and periodically evaluate progress
towards definite goals throughout the implementation process,
grants the public and stakeholders the opportunity to participate
throughout both implementation and evaluation of the directives.252
This highly participatory system between Member States,
analogous to coastal states within the United States, is similar to the
federal-state divide in the United States in some ocean policies,
notably the CZMA.
Despite the slow process of implementing the 2013 Directive,
the ongoing efforts of yearly management and evaluation of best
practices through the EUOAG indicate Europe’s willingness to
preemptively respond and adapt to environmental and safety
concerns as they arise, rather than relying on the engagement of
ordinary citizens or litigation-focused regulation. Member States
and companies benefit from ongoing collaborative efforts between
interested parties. Although the long-term environmental impacts
of the 2013 Directive are yet to be evaluated, the regulatory
structure within the EU offers distinct benefits in terms of industry
participation and citizens’ access to information. Those same
values of industry collaboration and access to information are
embraced by the OPC under the current Administration, though the
actual progress towards public participation in these goals is not
clearly evident through the White House’s website cataloging the
Trump Administration’s environmental initiatives.253
An additional benefit to the European method, particularly
employed under the OSPAR Convention, is the consideration of
specific areas of improvement and the evaluation of those criteria in
relation to each other. The United States’ method of evaluating each
proposed action and its potential environmental impacts does not
consider the ecosystem as a whole or the long-term goals for
development. Nor does the United States’ current ocean policy
252 For more information on the European Union’s Directives, see generally TFEU,
supra note 102.
253 See Initiatives, supra note 232.
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indicate an emphasis on evaluating proposals in relation to marine
spatial planning, which in turn would integrate long-term goals for
ocean use, the environment, and energy.
The previous ocean policy, exemplified in the IOPTF
recommendations endorsed by the Obama Administration in EO
13,547, encouraged exactly this kind of ecosystem-based
management to create a comprehensive program to address
concerns such as conservation and economic activity, while
coordinating science-based management across multiple levels of
government. Balancing the different uses of the ocean in relation to
long-term goals was a primary focus of the IOPTF-endorsed
system.254 Similarly, the OSPAR method of ecosystem-based
management embraced in Europe supports the wisdom of
integrating not just energy production goals, but broader
environmental concerns into marine development. The Trump
Administration’s framework has seemingly not embraced this
methodology, focusing instead on the development of offshore
energy as a driving force for ocean policy, rather than integrating
environmental or ecosystem-management concerns into a defined
ocean policy.
Furthermore, both the EU and the OSPAR Convention
encourage a regional approach to ocean management, recognizing
the value in managing ocean ecosystems in relation to the
geographic characteristics of the area. Under the current United
States ocean policy, regional collaboration is encouraged but not
required.255
The previous ocean policy mandated regional
collaboration, granting regional organizations more power to
collaborate with each other and with the federal government in the
management of coastal waters. While these are similar, the
voluntary nature of regional ocean partnerships under the current
ocean policy does not clearly emphasize collaborative efforts
between states with shared ocean ecosystems. Coastal states may
share similar opinions on the ideal uses for their coastal waters, but
they act individually in their opposition, rather than recognizing the
shared nature of the ocean waters that cross their borders. The
remaining regional ocean partnerships maintain their efforts to
manage their oceans and provide data to their members, but their
long-term success is still not assured by a strong federal policy that
254
255
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recognizes their efforts as a necessary part of ocean management.
The regulatory framework for ocean management within the
United States already requires the federal government to consult
with the affected coastal state under the CZMA, enabling coastal
states to have a say in the management of the oceans affecting their
coast. Although the regulatory framework concerning offshore
energy development is complex and difficult to manage, executive
orders issued under both Presidents Obama and Trump explicitly
acknowledge the value of federal and regional collaboration in
ocean management. Even though the Trump Administration shifted
the nation’s ocean policy to be more focused on economic
development, some of the structures created in the Obama
Administration’s EO 13,547 are retained in a slightly different form
within the Trump Administration’s framework. Notably, the Trump
Administration’s EO 13,840 encourages the same kind of regional
collaboration that the IOPTF recommended and that already existed
before the issuance of either EO. These regional partnerships could
enable regions of the United States to implement some of the ocean
management tools embraced by Europe and the IOPTF
recommendations through their regional partnership organizations
such as NROC and MARCO.
Within the established regional partnership framework
embraced by the current Administration, the creation of regional
goals for ocean management could provide a framework in which
to ensure consistency across states. States could follow the
European model of directives, where the primary goals are shared
by all states within the region, with implementation left to those
states within a set amount of time and with periods for evaluation
and feedback from a separate committee of regional members.
Although the EU directives are still undergoing a process of their
own, the model of an implementation period followed by feedback
could be useful as the United States’ ocean policy transitions under
the current Administration. In particular, the ability of the
overseeing committee, EUOAG, to issue guidance and evaluate best
practices would translate well to the role of the OPC. However, the
lack of data available from the efforts of the OPC subcommittees
limits the abilities of states, regional ocean partnerships,
stakeholders, and the public to participate in the development of
guidance and best practices.
The absence of the structure of a marine spatial plan to reinforce
the long-term goals of ocean use, particularly in relation to ocean
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use conflicts and environmental concerns, undermines the ability of
any interested parties to evaluate proposals in relation to specific
long-term goals. Instead, the current system still seems largely
project-focused, limited to the policy goals expressed by the Trump
Administration, rather than responding to the public opinion or the
priorities of coastal states that may be most affected by these plans.
Even as coastal states move towards encouraging offshore wind, the
Trump Administration nonetheless seems to oppose and undermine
these efforts, instead choosing to pursue unpopular development
goals.
The structures necessary for implementing the European model
for regulation into the United States’ framework already exist. By
integrating ecosystem-based management into regional ocean
partnerships and by encouraging collaboration and the exchange of
information between the federal oversight committee and
stakeholders, the United States’ ocean management can embrace
principles of sustainable development in the face of a changing
energy and environmental landscape.
VII. Conclusion
Although the regime for managing oceans and offshore energy
development are complex internationally and within the United
States, some regulatory structures have proven to be both successful
and adaptable in a changing energy landscape. The European Union
provides a useful model for regional collaboration and marine
planning, a model that could be adapted to the United States to
ensure sustainable marine management as more offshore lands are
opened to energy development. Many of the structures that would
encourage this development have already begun to form within the
United States, enabling the exact kinds of management embraced
by the European model.

